Most Americans don't think the American government had anything to
with 9/11. When I take my neutral stance that I don't know what happened on 9/11 they get very angry, accuse me of being a "truther" and then refuse to discuss it any further.
Obviously, this is just blind faith in our government. With NSA's near total surveillance, secret government memos to itself and new evidence that flight TWA 800 was accidentally shot down by the navy, blind trust in our government may be finally waning. A prescient quote:
"No matter how paranoid or conspiracy-minded you are, what the government is actually doing is worse than you imagine." --William Blum
The reason I don't know what happened on 9/11 is because we don't have all the facts. And the reason we don't have all the facts is because the 9/11 Commission was a cover-up. What they were covering up, we don't know. Was it incompetence by our intelligence agencies or something more sinister?
There are several issues that have not been explained to my satisfaction:
1) "
The Bombshell Memo." Colleen Rowley tried to warn the CIA and the FBI that terrorists were planning an attack on US soil but the warnings died going up the chain.
2) While flying an airplane into a building surprised most of us, our agencies were well aware of such a possibility and measures were in place to prevent such an attack. So what happened? Why were all our fighter jets out in the Atlantic doing military exercises that day?
3) Never before has a steel building collapsed from an airplane hit. It looked and sounded like a controlled demolition. Thermite was found in the metal which seems to back up the controlled demolition theory. Why was there such a huge rush to clean up the metal?
4) A third 47-story building, WTC 7, also collapsed on 9/11 without being hit by a plane. The owner of the WTC buildings, Larry Silverstein, said WTC 7 was "pulled" or demolished. The third metal building ever to collapse. No wonder architects and engineers are calling for a reinvestigation into 9/11.
I stand with OWS in calling for a reinvestigation into 9/11.
http://www.911truth.org/
http://www.ae911truth.org
http://www.911proof.com/
Update:
http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/12/27/342150/nyts-dc-correspondent-covers-up-911/
Appendix
From
http://www.apfn.org/apfn/wtc_whistleblower1.htm:
Coleen
Rowley's Memo to FBI Director Robert Mueller
An edited version of the agent's 13-page letter
May 21, 2002
FBI Director Robert Mueller
FBI Headquarters Washington, D.C.
Dear Director Mueller:
I feel at this point that I have to put my concerns in writing concerning
the important topic of the FBI's response to evidence of terrorist activity in
the United States prior to September 11th. The issues are fundamentally ones
of INTEGRITY and go to the heart of the FBI's law enforcement mission and
mandate. Moreover, at this critical juncture in fashioning future policy to
promote the most effective handling of ongoing and future threats to United
States citizens' security, it is of absolute importance that an unbiased,
completely accurate picture emerge of the FBI's current investigative and
management strengths and failures.
To get to the point, I have deep concerns that a delicate and subtle
shading/skewing of facts by you and others at the highest levels of FBI
management has occurred and is occurring. The term "cover up" would be too
strong a characterization which is why I am attempting to carefully (and
perhaps over laboriously) choose my words here. I base my concerns on my
relatively small, peripheral but unique role in the Moussaoui investigation in
the Minneapolis Division prior to, during and after September 11th and my
analysis of the comments I have heard both inside the FBI (originating, I
believe, from you and other high levels of management) as well as your
Congressional testimony and public comments.
I feel that certain facts, including the following, have, up to now, been
omitted, downplayed, glossed over and/or mis-characterized in an effort to
avoid or minimize personal and/or institutional embarrassment on the part of
the FBI and/or perhaps even for improper political reasons:
1) The Minneapolis agents who responded to the call about Moussaoui's
flight training identified him as a terrorist threat from a very early point.
The decision to take him into custody on August 15, 2001, on the INS
"overstay" charge was a deliberate one to counter that threat and was based on
the agents' reasonable suspicions. While it can be said that Moussaoui's
overstay status was fortuitous, because it allowed for him to be taken into
immediate custody and prevented him receiving any more flight training, it was
certainly not something the INS coincidentally undertook of their own
volition. I base this on the conversation I had when the agents called me at
home late on the evening Moussaoui was taken into custody to confer and ask
for legal advice about their next course of action. The INS agent was assigned
to the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force and was therefore working in tandem
with FBI agents.
2) As the Minneapolis agents' reasonable suspicions quickly ripened into
probable cause, which, at the latest, occurred within days of Moussaoui's
arrest when the French Intelligence Service confirmed his affiliations with
radical fundamentalist Islamic groups and activities connected to Osama Bin
Laden, they became desperate to search the computer lap top that had been
taken from Moussaoui as well as conduct a more thorough search of his personal
effects. The agents in particular believed that Moussaoui signaled he had
something to hide in the way he refused to allow them to search his computer.
3) The Minneapolis agents' initial thought was to obtain a criminal search
warrant, but in order to do so, they needed to get FBI Headquarters' (FBIHQ's)
approval in order to ask for DOJ OIPR's approval to contact the United States
Attorney's Office in Minnesota. Prior to and even after receipt of information
provided by the French, FBIHQ personnel disputed with the Minneapolis agents
the existence of probable cause to believe that a criminal violation had
occurred/was occurring. As such, FBIHQ personnel refused to contact OIPR to
attempt to get the authority. While reasonable minds may differ as to whether
probable cause existed prior to receipt of the French intelligence
information, it was certainly established after that point and became even
greater with successive, more detailed information from the French and other
intelligence sources. The two possible criminal violations initially
identified by Minneapolis Agents were violations of Title 18 United States
Code Section 2332b (Acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries, which,
notably, includes "creating a substantial risk of serious bodily injury to any
other person by destroying or damaging any structure, conveyance, or other
real or personal property within the United States or by attempting or
conspiring to destroy or damage any structure, conveyance, or other real or
personal property within the United States") and Section 32 (Destruction of
aircraft or aircraft facilities). It is important to note that the actual
search warrant obtained on September 11th was based on probable cause of a
violation of Section 32.
1
Notably also, the actual search warrant obtained on September 11th did not
include the French intelligence information. Therefore, the only main
difference between the information being submitted to FBIHQ from an early date
which HQ personnel continued to deem insufficient and the actual criminal
search warrant which a federal district judge signed and approved on September
11th, was the fact that, by the time the actual warrant was obtained,
suspected terrorists were known to have highjacked planes which they then
deliberately crashed into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. To say
then, as has been iterated numerous times, that probable cause did not exist
until after the disasterous event occurred, is really to acknowledge that the
missing piece of probable cause was only the FBI's (FBIHQ's) failure to
appreciate that such an event could occur. The probable cause did not
otherwise improve or change. When we went to the United States Attorney's
Office that morning of September 11th, in the first hour after the attack, we
used a disk containing the same information that had already been provided to
FBIHQ; then we quickly added Paragraph 19 which was the little we knew from
news reports of the actual attacks that morning. The problem with chalking
this all up to the "20-20 hindsight is perfect" problem, (which I, as all
attorneys who have been involved in deadly force training or the defense of
various lawsuits are fully appreciative of), is that this is not a case of
everyone in the FBI failing to appreciate the potential consequences. It is
obvious, from my firsthand knowledge of the events and the detailed
documentation that exists, that the agents in Minneapolis who were closest to
the action and in the best position to gauge the situation locally, did fully
appreciate the terrorist risk/danger posed by Moussaoui and his possible
co-conspirators even prior to September 11th. Even without knowledge of the
Phoenix communication (and any number of other additional intelligence
communications that FBIHQ personnel were privy to in their central
coordination roles), the Minneapolis agents appreciated the risk. So I think
it's very hard for the FBI to offer the "20-20 hindsight" justification for
its failure to act! Also intertwined with my reluctance in this case to accept
the "20-20 hindsight" rationale is first-hand knowledge that I have of
statements made on September 11th, after the first attacks on the World Trade
Center had already occurred, made telephonically by the FBI Supervisory
Special Agent (SSA) who was the one most involved in the Moussaoui matter and
who, up to that point, seemed to have been consistently, almost deliberately
thwarting the Minneapolis FBI agents' efforts (see number 5). Even after the
attacks had begun, the SSA in question was still attempting to block the
search of Moussaoui's computer, characterizing the World Trade Center attacks
as a mere coincidence with Misseapolis' prior suspicions about Moussaoui.
2
4) In one of my peripheral roles on the Moussaoui matter, I answered an
e-mail message on August 22, 2001, from an attorney at the National Security
Law Unit (NSLU). Of course, with (ever important!) 20-20 hindsight, I now wish
I had taken more time and care to compose my response. When asked by NSLU for
my "assessment of (our) chances of getting a criminal warrant to search
Moussaoui's computer", I answered, "Although I think there's a decent chance
of being able to get a judge to sign a criminal search warrant, our USAO seems
to have an even higher standard much of the time, so rather than risk it, I
advised that they should try the other route." Leaked news accounts which said
the Minneapolis Legal Counsel (referring to me) concurred with the FBIHQ that
probable cause was lacking to search Moussaoui's computer are in error. (or
possibly the leak was deliberately skewed in this fashion?) What I meant by
this pithy e-mail response, was that although I thought probable cause existed
("probable cause" meaning that the proposition has to be more likely than not,
or if quantified, a 51% likelihood), I thought our United States Attorney's
Office, (for a lot of reasons including just to play it safe) in regularly
requiring much more than probable cause before approving affidavits, (maybe,
if quantified, 75%-80% probability and sometimes even higher), and depending
on the actual AUSA who would be assigned, might turn us down. As a tactical
choice, I therefore thought it would be better to pursue the "other route"
(the FISA search warrant) first, the reason being that there is a common
perception, which for lack of a better term, I'll call the "smell test" which
has arisen that if the FBI can't do something through straight-up criminal
methods, it will then resort to using less-demanding intelligence methods. Of
course this isn't true, but I think the perception still exists. So, by this
line of reasoning, I was afraid that if we first attempted to go criminal and
failed to convince an AUSA, we wouldn't pass the "smell test" in subsequently
seeking a FISA. I thought our best chances therefore lay in first seeking the
FISA. Both of the factors that influenced my thinking are areas arguably in
need of improvement: requiring an excessively high standard of probable cause
in terrorism cases and getting rid of the "smell test" perception. It could
even be argued that FBI agents, especially in terrorism cases where time is of
the essence, should be allowed to go directly to federal judges to have their
probable cause reviewed for arrests or searches without having to gain the
USAO's approval.
4
5) The fact is that key FBIHQ personnel whose job it was to assist and
coordinate with field division agents on terrorism investigations and the
obtaining and use of FISA searches (and who theoretically were privy to many
more sources of intelligence information than field division agents),
continued to, almost inexplicably,
5
throw up roadblocks and undermine Minneapolis' by-now desperate efforts to
obtain a FISA search warrant, long after the French intelligence service
provided its information and probable cause became clear. HQ personnel brought
up almost ridiculous questions in their apparent efforts to undermine the
probable cause.
6
In all of their conversations and correspondence, HQ personnel never disclosed
to the Minneapolis agents that the Phoenix Division had, only approximately
three weeks earlier, warned of Al Qaeda operatives in flight schools seeking
flight training for terrorist purposes!
Nor did FBIHQ personnel do much to disseminate the information about
Moussaoui to other appropriate intelligence/law enforcement authorities. When,
in a desperate 11th hour measure to bypass the FBIHQ roadblock, the
Minneapolis Division undertook to directly notify the CIA's Counter Terrorist
Center (CTC), FBIHQ personnel actually chastised the Minneapolis agents for
making the direct notification without their approval!
6 ) Eventually on August 28, 2001, after a series of e-mails between
Minneapolis and FBIHQ, which suggest that the FBIHQ SSA deliberately further
undercut the FISA effort by not adding the further intelligence information
which he had promised to add that supported Moussaoui's foreign power
connection and making several changes in the wording of the information that
had been provided by the Minneapolis Agent, the Minneapolis agents were
notified that the NSLU Unit Chief did not think there was sufficient evidence
of Moussaoui's connection to a foreign power. Minneapolis personnel are, to
this date, unaware of the specifics of the verbal presentations by the FBIHQ
SSA to NSLU or whether anyone in NSLU ever was afforded the opportunity to
actually read for him/herself all of the information on Moussaoui that had
been gathered by the Minneapolis Division and the French intelligence service.
Obviously verbal presentations are far more susceptible to mis-characterization
and error. The e-mail communications between Minneapolis and FBIHQ, however,
speak for themselves and there are far better witnesses than me who can
provide their first hand knowledge of these events characterized in one
Minneapolis agent's e-mail as FBIHQ is "setting this up for failure." My only
comment is that the process of allowing the FBI supervisors to make changes in
affidavits is itself fundamentally wrong, just as, in the follow-up to FBI
Laboratory Whistleblower Frederic Whitehurst's allegations, this process was
revealed to be wrong in the context of writing up laboratory results. With the
Whitehurst allegations, this process of allowing supervisors to re-write
portions of laboratory reports, was found to provide opportunities for
over-zealous supervisors to skew the results in favor of the prosecution. In
the Moussaoui case, it was the opposite -- the process allowed the
Headquarters Supervisor to downplay the significance of the information thus
far collected in order to get out of the work of having to see the FISA
application through or possibly to avoid taking what he may have perceived as
an unnecessary career risk.
7
I understand that the failures of the FBIHQ personnel involved in the
Moussaoui matter are also being officially excused because they were too busy
with other investigations, the Cole bombing and other important terrorism
matters, but the Supervisor's taking of the time to read each word of the
information submitted by Minneapolis and then substitute his own choice of
wording belies to some extent the notion that he was too busy. As an FBI
division legal advisor for 12 years (and an FBI agent for over 21 years), I
can state that an affidavit is better and will tend to be more accurate when
the affiant has first hand information of all the information he/she must
attest to. Of necessity, agents must continually rely upon information from
confidential sources, third parties and other law enforcement officers in
drafting affidavits, but the repeating of information from others greatly adds
to the opportunities for factual discrepancies and errors to arise. To the
extent that we can minimize the opportunity for this type of error to arise by
simply not allowing unnecessary re-writes by supervisory staff, it ought to be
done. (I'm not talking, of course, about mere grammatical corrections, but
changes of some substance as apparently occurred with the Moussaoui
information which had to be, for lack of a better term, "filtered" through
FBIHQ before any action, whether to seek a criminal or a FISA warrant, could
be taken.) Even after September 11th, the fear was great on the part of
Minneapolis Division personnel that the same FBIHQ personnel would continue
their "filtering" with respect to the Moussaoui investigation, and now with
the added incentive of preventing their prior mistakes from coming to light.
For this reason, for weeks, Minneapolis prefaced all outgoing communications (ECs)
in the PENTTBOM investigation with a summary of the information about
Moussaoui. We just wanted to make sure the information got to the proper
prosecutive authorities and was not further suppressed! This fear was probably
irrational but was nonetheless understandable in light of the Minneapolis
agents' prior experiences and frustrations involving FBIHQ. (The redundant
preface information regarding Moussaoui on otherwise unrelative PENTTBOM
communications has ended up adding to criminal discovery issues, but this is
the reason it was done.)
7) Although the last thing the FBI or the country needs now is a witch
hunt, I do find it odd that (to my knowledge) no inquiry whatsoever was
launched of the relevant FBIHQ personnel's actions a long time ago. Despite
FBI leaders' full knowledge of all the items mentioned herein (and probably
more that I'm unaware of), the SSA, his unit chief, and other involved HQ
personnel were allowed to stay in their positions and, what's worse, occupy
critical positions in the FBI's SIOC Command Center post September 11th. (The
SSA in question actually received a promotion some months afterward!) It's
true we all make mistakes and I'm not suggesting that HQ personnel in question
ought to be burned at the stake, but, we all need to be held accountable for
serious mistakes. I'm relatively certain that if it appeared that a lowly
field office agent had committed such errors of judgment, the FBI's OPR would
have been notified to investigate and the agent would have, at the least, been
quickly reassigned. I'm afraid the FBI's failure to submit this matter to OPR
(and to the IOB) gives further impetus to the notion (raised previously by
many in the FBI) of a double standard which results in those of lower rank
being investigated more aggressively and dealt with more harshly for
misconduct while the misconduct of those at the top is often overlooked or
results in minor disciplinary action. From all appearances, this double
standard may also apply between those at FBIHQ and those in the field.
8) The last official "fact" that I take issue with is not really a fact,
but an opinion, and a completely unsupported opinion at that. In the day or
two following September 11th, you, Director Mueller, made the statement to the
effect that if the FBI had only had any advance warning of the attacks, we
(meaning the FBI), may have been able to take some action to prevent the
tragedy. Fearing that this statement could easily come back to haunt the FBI
upon revelation of the information that had been developed pre-September 11th
about Moussaoui, I and others in the Minneapolis Office, immediately sought to
reach your office through an assortment of higher level FBIHQ contacts, in
order to quickly make you aware of the background of the Moussaoui
investigation and forewarn you so that your public statements could be
accordingly modified. When such statements from you and other FBI officials
continued, we thought that somehow you had not received the message and we
made further efforts. Finally when similar comments were made weeks later, in
Assistant Director Caruso's congressional testimony in response to the first
public leaks about Moussaoui we faced the sad realization that the remarks
indicated someone, possibly with your approval, had decided to circle the
wagons at FBIHQ in an apparent effort to protect the FBI from embarrassment
and the relevant FBI officials from scrutiny. Everything I have seen and heard
about the FBI's official stance and the FBI's internal preparations in
anticipation of further congressional inquiry, had, unfortunately, confirmed
my worst suspicions in this regard. After the details began to emerge
concerning the pre-September 11th investigation of Moussaoui, and subsequently
with the recent release of the information about the Phoenix EC, your
statement has changed. The official statement is now to the effect that even
if the FBI had followed up on the Phoenix lead to conduct checks of flight
schools and the Minneapolis request to search Moussaoui's personal effects and
laptop, nothing would have changed and such actions certainly could not have
prevented the terrorist attacks and resulting loss of life. With all due
respect, this statement is as bad as the first! It is also quite at odds with
the earlier statement (which I'm surprised has not already been pointed out by
those in the media!) I don't know how you or anyone at FBI Headquarters, no
matter how much genius or prescience you may possess, could so blithely make
this affirmation without anything to back the opinion up than your stature as
FBI Director. The truth is, as with most predictions into the future, no one
will ever know what impact, if any, the FBI's following up on those requests,
would have had. Although I agree that it's very doubtful that the full scope
of the tragedy could have been prevented, it's at least possible we could have
gotten lucky and uncovered one or two more of the terrorists in flight
training prior to September 11th, just as Moussaoui was discovered, after
making contact with his flight instructors. It is certainly not beyond the
realm of imagination to hypothesize that Moussaoui's fortuitous arrest alone,
even if he merely was the 20th hijacker, allowed the hero passengers of Flight
93 to overcome their terrorist hijackers and thus spare more lives on the
ground. And even greater casualties, possibly of our Nation's highest
government officials, may have been prevented if Al Qaeda intended for
Moussaoui to pilot an entirely different aircraft. There is, therefore at
least some chance that discovery of other terrorist pilots prior to September
11th may have limited the September 11th attacks and resulting loss of life.
Although your conclusion otherwise has to be very reassuring for some in the
FBI to hear being repeated so often (as if saying it's so may make it so), I
think your statements demonstrate a rush to judgment to protect the FBI at all
costs. I think the only fair response to this type of question would be that
no one can pretend to know one way or another.
Mr. Director, I hope my observations can be taken in a constructive vein.
They are from the heart and intended to be completely apolitical. Hopefully,
with our nation's security on the line, you and our nation's other elected and
appointed officials can rise above the petty politics that often plague other
discussions and do the right thing. You do have some good ideas for change in
the FBI but I think you have also not been completely honest about some of the
true reasons for the FBI's pre-September 11th failures. Until we come clean
and deal with the root causes, the Department of Justice will continue to
experience problems fighting terrorism and fighting crime in general.
I have used the "we" term repeatedly herin to indicate facts about others
in the Minneapolis Office at critical times, but none of the opinions
expressed herin can be attributed to anyone but myself. I know that those who
know me would probably describe me as, by nature, overly opinionated and
sometimes not as discreet as I should be. Certainly some of the above remarks
may be interpreted as falling into that category, but I really do not intend
anything as a personal criticism of you or anyone else in the FBI, to include
the FBIHQ personnel who I believe were remiss and mishandled their duties with
regard to the Moussaoui investigation. Truly my only purpose is to try to
provide the facts within my purview so that an accurate assessment can be
obtained and we can learn from our mistakes. I have pointed out a few of the
things that I think should be looked at but there are many, many more.
8
An honest acknowledgment of the FBI's mistakes in this and other cases should
not lead to increasing the Headquarters bureaucracy and approval levels of
investigative actions as the answer. Most often, field office agents and field
office management on the scene will be better suited to the timely and
effective solution of crimes and, in some lucky instances, to the effective
prevention of crimes, including terrorism incidents. The relatively quick
solving of the recent mailbox pipe-bombing incidents which resulted in no
serious injuries to anyone are a good example of effective field office work
(actually several field offices working together) and there are hundreds of
other examples. Although FBIHQ personnel have, no doubt, been of immeasurable
assistance to the field over the years, I'm hard pressed to think of any case
which has been solved by FBIHQ personnel and I can name several that have been
screwed up! Decision-making is inherently more effective and timely when
decentralized instead of concentrated.
Your plans for an FBI Headquarters' "Super Squad" simply fly in the face of
an honest appraisal of the FBI's pre-September 11th failures. The Phoenix,
Minneapolis and Paris Legal Attache Offices reacted remarkably exhibiting keen
perception and prioritization skills regarding the terrorist threats they
uncovered or were made aware of pre-September 11th. The same cannot be said
for the FBI Headquarters' bureaucracy and you want to expand that?! Should we
put the counterterrorism unit chief and SSA who previously handled the
Moussaoui matter in charge of the new "Super Squad"?! You are also apparently
disregarding the fact the Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs), operating out
of field divisions for years, (the first and chief one being New York City's
JTTF), have successfully handled numerous terrorism investigations and, in
some instances, successfully prevented acts of terrorism. There's no denying
the need for more and better intelligence and intelligence management, but you
should think carefully about how much gate keeping power should be entrusted
with any HQ entity. If we are indeed in a "war", shouldn't the Generals be on
the battlefield instead of sitting in a spot removed from the action while
still attempting to call the shots?
I have been an FBI agent for over 21 years and, for what it's worth, have
never received any form of disciplinary action throughout my career. From the
5th grade, when I first wrote the FBI and received the "100 Facts about the
FBI" pamphlet, this job has been my dream. I feel that my career in the FBI
has been somewhat exemplary, having entered on duty at a time when there was
only a small percentage of female Special Agents. I have also been lucky to
have had four children during my time in the FBI and am the sole breadwinner
of a family of six. Due to the frankness with which I have expressed myself
and my deep feelings on these issues, (which is only because I feel I have a
somewhat unique, inside perspective of the Moussaoui matter, the gravity of
the events of September 11th and the current seriousness of the FBI's and
United States' ongoing efforts in the "war against terrorism"), I hope my
continued employment with the FBI is not somehow placed in jeopardy. I have
never written to an FBI Director in my life before on any topic. Although I
would hope it is not necessary, I would therefore wish to take advantage of
the federal "Whistleblower Protection" provisions by so characterizing my
remarks.
Sincerely
Coleen M. Rowley
Special Agent and Minneapolis Chief Division Counsel
NOTES
1) And both of the violations originally cited in vain by
the Minneapolis agents disputing the issue with FBIHQ personnel are among
those on which Moussaoui is currently indicted.
2) Just minutes after I saw the first news of the World
Trade Center attack(s), I was standing outside the office of Minneapolis ASAC
M. Chris Briesse waiting for him to finish with a phone call, when he received
a call on another line from this SSA. Since I figured I knew what the call may
be about and wanted to ask, in light of the unfolding events and the apparent
urgency of the situation, if we should now immediately attempt to obtain a
criminal search warrant for Moussaoui's laptop and personal property, I took
the call. I said something to the effect that, in light of what had just
happened in New York, it would have to be the "hugest coincidence" at this
point if Moussaoui was not involved with the terrorists. The SSA stated
something to the effect that I had used the right term, "coincidence" and that
this was probably all just a coincidence and we were to do nothing in
Minneapolis until we got their (HQ's) permission because we might "screw up"
something else going on elsewhere in the country.
4) Certainly Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure which begins, "Upon the request of a federal law enforcement officer
or an attorney for the government" does not contain this requirement.
Although the practice that has evolved is that FBI agents must secure prior
approval for any search or arrest from the United States Attorneys Office, the
Federal Rule governing Search and Seizure clearly envisions law enforcement
officers applying, on their own, for search warrants.
5) During the early aftermath of September 11th, when I
happened to be recounting the pre-September 11th events concerning the
Moussaoui investigation to other FBI personnel in other divisions or in FBIHQ,
almost everyone's first question was "Why?--Why would an FBI agent(s)
deliberately sabotage a case? (I know I shouldn't be flippant about this, but
jokes were actually made that the key FBIHQ personnel had to be spies or
moles, like Robert Hansen, who were actually working for Osama Bin Laden to
have so undercut Minneapolis' effort.) Our best real guess, however, is that,
in most cases avoidance of all "unnecessary" actions/decisions by FBIHQ
managers (and maybe to some extent field managers as well) has, in recent
years, been seen as the safest FBI career course. Numerous high-ranking FBI
officials who have made decisions or have taken actions which, in hindsight,
turned out to be mistaken or just turned out badly (i.e. Ruby Ridge, Waco,
etc.) have seen their careers plummet and end. This has in turn resulted in a
climate of fear which has chilled aggressive FBI law enforcement
action/decisions. In a large hierarchal bureaucracy such as the FBI, with the
requirement for numerous superiors approvals/oversight, the premium on
career-enhancement, and interjecting a chilling factor brought on by recent
extreme public and congressional criticism/oversight, and I think you will see
at least the makings of the most likely explanation. Another factor not to be
underestimated probably explains the SSA and other FBIHQ personnel's
reluctance to act. And so far, I have heard no FBI official even allude to
this problem-- which is that FBI Headquarters is staffed with a number of
short term careerists* who, like the SSA in question, must only serve an 18
month-just-time-to-get-your-
ticket-punched minimum. It's no wonder why very
little expertise can be acquired by a Headquarters unit! (And no wonder why
FBIHQ is mired in mediocrity! -- that maybe a little strong, but it would
definitely be fair to say that there is unevenness in competency among
Headquarters personnel.) (It's also a well known fact that the FBI Agents
Association has complained for years about the disincentives facing those
entering the FBI management career path which results in very few of the FBI's
best and brightest choosing to go into management. Instead the ranks of FBI
management are filled with many who were failures as street agents. Along
these lines, let me ask the question, why has it suddenly become necessary for
the Director to "handpick" the FBI management?)
It's quite conceivable that
many of the HQ personnel who so vigorously disputed Moussaoui's
ability/predisposition to fly a plane into a building were simply unaware of
all the various incidents and reports worldwide of Al Qaeda terrorists
attempting or plotting to do so.
*By the way, just in the event you did not know, let me furnish you the
Webster's definition of "careerism - - the policy or practice of advancing
one's career often at the cost of one's integrity". Maybe that sums up the
whole problem!
6) For example, at one point, the Supervisory Special
Agent at FBIHQ posited that the French information could be worthless because
it only identified Zacarias Moussaoui by name and he, the SSA, didn't know how
many people by that name existed in France. A Minneapolis agent attempted to
surmount that problem by quickly phoning the FBI's legal Attache (Legat) in
Paris, France, so that a check could be made of the French telephone
directories. Although the Legat in France did not have access to all of the
French telephone directories, he was able to quickly ascertain that there was
only one listed in the Paris directory. It is not known if this sufficiently
answered the question, for the SSA continued to find new reasons to stall.
7) Another factor that cannot be underestimated as to the
HQ Supervisor's apparent reluctance to do anything was/is the ever present
risk of being "written up" for an Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) "error."
In the year(s) preceding the September 11th acts of terrorism, numerous
alleged IOB violations on the part of FBI personnel had to be submitted to the
FBI's Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) as well as the IOB. I
believe the chilling effect upon all levels of FBI agents assigned to
intelligence matters and their manager hampered us from aggressive
investigation of terrorists. Since one generally only runs the risk of IOB
violations when one does something, the safer course is to do nothing.
Ironically, in this case, a potentially huge IOB violation arguably occurred
due to FBIHQ's failure to act, that is, FBIHQ's failure to inform the
Department of Justice Criminal Division of Moussaoui's potential criminal
violations (which, as I've already said, were quickly identified in
Minneapolis as violations of Title 18 United States Code Section 2332b [Acts
of terrorism transcending national boundaries] and Section 32 [Destruction of
aircraft or aircraft facilities]). This failure would seem to run clearly
afoul of the Attorney General directive contained in the "1995 Procedures for
Contacts Between the FBI and the Criminal Division Concerning Foreign
Intelligence and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations" which mandatorily
require the FBI to notify the Criminal Division when "facts or circumstances
are developed" in an FI or FCI investigation "that reasonably indicate that a
significant federal crime has been, is being, or may be committed." I believe
that Minneapolis agents actually brought this point to FBIHQ's attention on
August 22, 2001, but HQ personnel apparently ignored the directive, ostensibly
due to their opinion of the lack of probable cause. But the issue of whether
HQ personnel deliberately undercut the probable cause can be sidestepped at
this point because the Directive does not require probable cause. It requires
only a "reasonable indication" which is defined as "substantially lower than
probable cause." Given that the Minneapolis Division had accumulated far more
than "a mere hunch" (which the directive would deem as insufficient), the
information ought to have, at least, been passed on to the "Core Group"
created to assess whether the information needed to be further disseminated to
the Criminal Division. However, (and I don't know for sure), but to date, I
have never heard that any potential violation of this directive has been
submitted to the IOB or to the FBI's OPR. It should also be noted that when
making determinations of whether items need to be submitted to the IOB, it is
my understanding that NSLU normally used/uses a broad approach, erring, when
in doubt, on the side of submitting potential violations.
8) For starters, if prevention rather than prosecution is
to be our new main goal, (an objective I totally agree with), we need more
guidance on when we can apply the Quarles "public safety" exception to
Miranda's 5th Amendment requirements.
We were prevented from even
attempting to question Moussaoui on the day of the attacks when, in theory, he
could have possessed further information about other co-conspirators.}
(Apparently no government attorney believes there is a "public safety"
exception in a situation like this?!)
http://www.time.com/time/covers/1101020603/memo.html
BREAKING NEWS
FBI's 'Phoenix' Memo Unmasked
Fortune's investigative reporter, the only journalist to see confidential
document, reveals its true name and nature.
Ken Williams, FBI agent who wrote the "Phoenix" memo.
What happens when bosses ignore memos from subordinates? The country is now
learning the answer to that question in a most painful way.
On July 10, 2001, an FBI agent in Phoenix wrote a memo raising serious
concerns about Middle Eastern men attending U.S. flight schools. The memo
never made its way up the chain of command, and no action was taken. It wasn't
seen by FBI Director Robert Mueller until after Sept. 11, and President Bush
wasn't made aware of its contents until a few weeks ago. The confidential
document still hasn't been released, and yesterday it was the subject of a
closed-door Senate Intelligence Committee session.Recently, I had a chance to
read the memo -- apparently the first journalist to have done so. It was shown
to me by a reliable government source, who permitted me to take notes but
wouldn't let me copy it. What I learned -- and what FORTUNE aired yesterday on
CNN -- is chilling. The memo raises questions about what federal law
enforcement officers knew and what they did or didn't do to protect the U.S.
from terror attacks in the months before Sept. 11. After reviewing the memo,
one cannot help but conclude that the FBI dropped the ball -- perhaps ignoring
the alert altogether.
The memo was written by Phoenix FBI Special Agent Kenneth J. Williams,
described as a member of "Squad 16," and it was approved by a man named
William A. Kurtz. The title reads: "Zakaria Mustapha Soubra; IT-OTHER (Islamic
Army of the Caucasus)." The "synopsis" says: "Usama bin Laden and Al-Muhjiroun
supporters attending civil aviation universities/colleges in Arizona." And the
memo bears the FBI codes: "Derived from G-3" and "Declassify on X1."
Soubra, the memo said, was a student at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
in Prescott, Ariz. (According to the Los Angeles Times, he was questioned by
FBI agents in 2000, after he was observed at a shooting range with another
Muslim, who was a veteran of Islamic jihads in the Balkans and the Middle
East. No charges were brought against him, and he is currently a senior at
Embry-Riddle.) The organization named in the memo's title, the Islamic Army of
the Caucasus, is based in Chechnya and was at one time headed by a man named
Amir Khattab, who, according news reports, is suspected of having ties to
Osama bin Laden.
The FBI's probe of Soubra, according to the Williams memo, was instituted on
April 17, 2000, nearly 17 months before last year's terror attacks. Williams
warns in his July 10 memo of a possible "effort by Usama bin Laden to send
students to the U.S. to attend civil aviation universities and colleges." He
also refers to a "fatwa by Al-Muhjiroun, spiritual leader Sheikh Omar Bakri
Mohammed Fostok." (Fostok, according to news reports, once ran a London-based
radical group called the Islamic Liberation Party, dedicated to overthrowing
Western society. He was arrested for suggesting that it was permissible to
kill then British Prime Minister John Major, which he denied and was released
without any charges being filed.)
The Williams memo included the names of several Middle Eastern students, one
identified as a "Saudi national," who were apparently students at Embry-Riddle
at the time. One reason FBI officials have given for not releasing the memo is
that several of these individuals are still under investigation. So, although
those names are now in my notebook, they will not be published here.
FBI officials apparently didn't do much with the Phoenix memo. It was sent to
roughly a dozen FBI officials, none of whom apparently sent it to the agency's
acting director. FBI Director Mueller, who took over in early September,
before the attacks, concedes that the agency didn't act aggressively on the
memo. Among other lapses, it never shared the memo with the CIA, which only
learned of its existence a few weeks ago.
So the question is: Had senior FBI officials, the CIA, and the Bush
Administration seen the Phoenix memo, could they have stitched together enough
clues to prevent the terror attacks? That's something that may take months of
hearings and investigation to answer. But the first step is clear: The memo
should be released immediately, names blacked-out if necessary, so we can all
learn what Agent Williams knew.
